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ABSTRACT
Watermarking can be modeled as a transmission through a
steganographic channel. Most of the channel studied up to
now in the literature were additive or substitutive channels
where the noise modifies the data values. But other modifi-
cations occur frequently during the watermark life, namely
geometric distortions: images may be cropped, scaled and
even non-linearly distorted by digital/analog conversion or
by an attacker. We model here the geometric transforma-
tions by a geometric channel and introduce a random vari-
able, the index variable, to model geometric deformations.
We propose to use a synchronisation pattern to estimate geo-
metric distortions caused by the jitter attack, and describe an
optimal estimation algorithm, named Forward-Backward.
1. INTRODUCTION
It is now well known that watermarking can be modeled
as furtive communication through a steganographic chan-
nel. The steganographic channel may comprise additive
noise, which modifies the value of data samples, but also
geometric noise, which modifies the location of data sam-
ples. Some methods have been developped to enhance the
watermark retrieval after a geometric attack [1][2][3]. We
here propose a general model geometric channels, by intro-
ducing a random field, named the index variable. The law
followed by this variable determines the type of transform
(e.g. local or global transform). We here address the jitter
attack, and propose to model it by a Markov law for the in-
dex variable. We embed a known synchronisation pattern,
and use this pattern at the receptor side to estimate the mod-
ification caused by the jitter, based on the above model. To
perform this, we propose an optimal estimation algorithm
named Forward-Backward.
2. A CHANNEL MODEL FOR GEOMETRICAL
ATTACKS
2.1. General models for geometric channels : the index
variable
Let be the original cover data and be the resulting
cover data after a geometric transformation. For images,
and are 2-dimensional arrays, not necessarily of the
same size. To model the geometric channel, we introduce
the 2-dimensional random field such that, for every pixel
at location in , gives the location of the cor-
responding pixel in , i.e.
where .
The random law on determines the type of transfor-
mation. In particular, the correlations between elements of
are of greatest importance. for instance, elements of
are globally correlated in global transformations (there is
only a few degrees of freedomfor the whole field). In local
transforms, the value of can not, in a realistic case,
be “too far” from the values of , ,
etc.
2.2. A Markov model for the jitter attack
We study here the jitter attack described by Petitcolas [4],
where an attacker tries to desynchronize the watermark by
duplicating or deleting randomly some lines of the image.
Note that here a one-dimensional index variable is sufficient
to describe the transformation (see Figure 2). For the sake
of simplicity, we will thus from now on consider , , and
as a 1-D sequences. The probability of row deletion is
noted and the probability of row copy is noted .
Note that, for the jitter attack, we have for all
, that is to say that the jitter preserves the order between
rows. Moreover, as copies and deletions are independant,
the value taken by only depends on the value taken by
Fig. 1. Example of a geometric transformation : the im-
age has been deformed into . The arrows represent the
value taken by the index variable , which maps pixels of
into the corresponding pixels in .
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Fig. 2. Example of a jitter on a sequence , producing the
output sequence , and the corresponding index variables
Fig. 3. Markov chain representation of the jitter attack. The
states of the chain are the values taken by
, i.e. :
(1)
otherwise saying, the form a Markov chain. The
probabilities of transition between states have been com-
puted in [5], and the state graph of the Markov chain is rep-
resented in figure 3.
A realistic channel model for a watermarking system is
the compound channel, made up of a jitter channel (or more
generally any geometric channel) followed by an additive
noise channel . We model the noise (due to the image) as
AWGN (of course the method can be adapted to any type of
noise). In the following, we will restrict to the case where
the sample of the noise are independent (i.e. the noise is
white).
3. SYNCHRONISATION WATERMARK FOR THE
JITTER CHANNEL
3.1. Synchronisation pattern embedding
We propose to use a synchronisation watermark to estimate
the geometric transforms. The synchronisation pattern is
a matrix , following a gaussian law with zero mean and
variance , whose size is the same than the cover-image.
is embedded inside the cover-image by a spatial additive
method. The resulting picture is then watermarked with the
useful message, to produce image . is transmitted over
the watermark channel, where jitter as well as additive noise
may occur. Additive noise has variance and is supposed
to be white.
3.2. MAP estimation : the Forward-Backward algo-
rithm
The receiver gets the possibly modified picture , and,
based on the synchronisation pattern , has to estimate
the jitter realization, i.e. the index of the deleted lines and
copied lines. We propose here to perform the MAP for each
component of , i.e. we try to maximise
(2)
for every line of . By applying Bayes formula, the lo-
cally estimated index variable is given by
(3)
We introduce two families of pdf, et , defined
by
(4)
(5)
We show now that can be expressed with
and :
(6)
(7)
where we use the fact that follows a Markov law and is
white.
We now have to evaluate and for all and
for all . We show that they can be computed recursively1
First, we compute using the values of :
The equation 8 is obtained by taking the marginal over vari-
able and applying Bayes theorem. We then use the
Markov property and the whiteness of additive noise to de-
duce equation 8.
In a similar way, we can compute recursively
from the values of , by explointing the jitter marko-
vianity and the whiteness of additive noise. We have :
4. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
4.1. Registration performances
To caracterise the performances of the algorithms, we will
use the rate of mis-registered lines, defined as follows :
1l
being the real value of the jitter parameters and being
the estimated value. The tests have been performed on ten
gray-level pictures of size 500x500, with .
The influence of the jitter parameter is shown on Figure
4, for , and . We see that, even
1In the following, for the sake of clarity, we will suppress the reference
to the synchronisation pattern (all the probabilities are conditionnal to
).
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Fig. 4. Percentage of mis-registered lines in function of the
jitter parameter
when the strength of the synchronisation pattern is low, the
algorithm enables to lower the rate of mis-registered lines.
Figure 5 shows the influence of the JPEG quality factor
. Note that the results are better at high for high, and
are better at low for . This can be explained by the fact
that the noise caused by JPEG is neither additive, nor white.
Thus, the method may be improved by taking into account
the specificity of the noise caused by JPEG.
4.2. Improvement on the user-watermark decoding
We have studied the influence of the jitter and the com-
pensation on the user-watermark. We use here the block-
based modulation technique derived from the one proposed
by Zhao and Koch [6]. We have then applied the watermark
decoding algorithm, on the one hand on the jittered image,
on the other hand on the jittered, then forward-backward
compensated image. The watermark decoding has been per-
formed in a bit-by-bit fashion, and then we have computed
the capacity of the equivalent channel, i.e. the jitter chan-
nel in the first case, and the combined “jitter-compensation”
channel in the second case.
The results2 are given on Figure 6. One can see that
even a slight jitter greatly affects the user-watermark de-
coding. The compensation algorithms deeply enhance the
watermark decoding at low jitter.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper we propose a new methodology to describe ge-
ometric attacks. We model geometric distortions by consid-
ering the data indexes as random variables. More precisely,
in the jitter case, these indexes form a Markov chain. We
2The capacity is measured in Shannon by 8x8 block
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Fig. 5. Evolution of the percentage of mis-registered lines
with the JPEG quality factor (Q)
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Fig. 6. Capacity of the equivalent channel after a jitter at-
tack and after a combined jitter-compensation transforma-
tion
then use a compound channel, combining geometric noise
and additive noise, to provide a realistic model of the attacks
undergone by the watermark. We propose an algorithm, us-
ing a synchronisation pattern known at the receptor size, to
estimate the jitter realization. Experiments show that the re-
trieval of the useful watermark is improved on the registered
images obtained by “undoing” the jitter, based on the above
estimation.
The principles of the proposed algorithms can be apply to
more complex geometric transforms. The StirMark attacks
may forinstancebe considered : in this case, we would use
a Markov field model instead of Markov chains, and could
use algorithms like ICM or to estimate the transfomration.
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